During the past 30 years, almost all developed countries have experienced increases in manufacturing exports as a share of GDP. Figure 1 shows that, among 22 OECD countries, only one has experienced a decrease. 1 For the OECD overall, the manufacturing export share of GDP rose at an annual rate of 1.4 percent per year between 1970 and 1998. Figure 1 also shows, however, that during the same period, all but three countries have experienced declines in manufacturing value-added as a share of GDP. Again, for the OECD overall, this share declined at a rate of 1.3 percent per year.
These two facts are important and puzzling. Important, because manufacturing's significance in world trade continues to rise. As of 2001, manufacturing constituted 89 percent of OECD merchandise exports. Puzzling, because they imply that most of the world's major economies are exporting more and more of goods that they are producing less and less of.
The goal of this paper is to examine whether these facts can be jointly explained by international trade theory. We focus on one of the workhorse models of international trade, Helpman and Krugman's (1985) version of the monopolistic competition model. To generate implications for changes in manufacturing exports and manufacturing GDP, we subject the model to three types of "shocks" that capture essential features of the global economy over the past three decades: increases in manufacturing productivity, increases in non-manufacturing productivity, and decreases in trade barriers. We assess whether any of these shocks is capable of replicating the above pattern.
Our work is related to and builds on Bergoeing and Kehoe (2003 We have two main results: (1) Neither manufacturing nor non-manufacturing productivity shocks can deliver the two facts. This is true under free trade or under positive transport costs. With these shocks, output and exports move together; (2) When we allow for transport costs in the model to decline over time, (our globalization scenario), we can qualitatively generate the two facts for one or both countries. This is particularly true when the elasticity of substitution between manufacturing and non-manufacturing goods is low. We question whether this scenario can explain the two facts quantitatively, however.
We conclude by suggesting that vertical specialization -as defined by Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) , when a good is produced in multiple stages in multiple countries -can resolve the puzzle.
I. MODEL
The production side of our model is the same as in Helpman and Krugman (1985) . There are two countries; two sectors, a non-manufacturing sector and a manufacturing sector; and a fixed endowment of a single factor, labor ( L ). All goods are final goods. The nonmanufacturing sector consists of a single good produced by constant returns to scale, while the manufacturing sector consists of differentiated varieties with each variety produced according to increasing returns. The technologies for these two types of goods are identical across the two countries, and are
where n A and m A are non-manufacturing and manufacturing productivity, z indexes variety, n and ( ) m z are labor inputs, and F is a fixed cost.
Preferences are also identical across countries. Following BK, we allow for nonhomothetic utility and for non-unitary elasticities of substitution between sectors: τ > units must be shipped.
Our model does not yield analytical solutions except in special cases. There is, however, a very simple and useful expression for the manufacturing output share of GDP of country i,
In logarithms, the change in the manufacturing share equals the change in the interval of manufacturing goods produced minus the change in manufacturing productivity.
II. IMPLICATIONS UNDER FREE TRADE
Because technologies are identical across countries, under free trade, wages are equalized; moreover, the allocation of labor into manufacturing and non-manufacturing is indeterminate. For any given i m D , however, the manufacturing output share of GDP is i µ , and the manufacturing export share of GDP (in country 1) is
Exports are a fixed fraction of output with the fraction equaling country 2's share of the world labor endowment -a standard result from monopolistic competition models. Now, assume that relative country sizes do not change. Then, in terms of Figure 1 , the model implies that -regardless of the pattern of manufacturing and non-manufacturing productivity shocks (changes to n A and m A ) -(logarithmic) growth rates in the manufacturing output share of GDP and in the manufacturing export share of GDP should lie on the 45 degree line going through the origin. Both countries should be in the Northeast or the Southwest quadrants. As Figure 1 shows, this implication is clearly counterfactual.
III. IMPLICATIONS UNDER TRADE BARRIERS: PRODUCTIVITY SHOCKS
With transport costs, the model's equilibrium is determinate. We consider two transport cost specifications, one in which transport costs only apply to manufactured goods, and one in which (uniform) transport costs apply to both types of goods. We first examine productivity shocks, and then we examine changes in transport costs. When the price elasticity of demand is less than 1 ( 0 η < ), the opposite implications obtain. This suggests that, for all sets of productivity shocks, and regardless of the demand elasticity, countries will lie either in the Northeast quadrant or the Southwest quadrant, but not in the Northwest quadrant. This is again highly counterfactual.
When

IV. IMPLICATIONS UNDER TRADE BARRIERS: TRADE COST SHOCKS
We study the effects of declining trade costs (globalization) for our two transport cost specifications. In our first specification -transport costs only on manufactured goods - , therefore, declines in transport costs have no effect on the manufacturing output share of GDP.
Under more general preferences, when the price elasticity of demand is less than 1 ( 0 η < ), it is possible for both countries to suffer declines in the manufactured output share of GDP. The intuition here is straightforward. When trade costs fall, the manufactured bundle becomes cheaper. There is some substitution to manufactured goods, but because the demand elasticity is less than 1, the substitution is less than proportional. Expenditure on such goods falls as a share of GDP. Then, output on manufacturing falls, too. Meanwhile, manufacturing exports rise because trade costs fell.
This scenario suggests that it is possible to qualitatively replicate the puzzle facts: a globalization scenario in which trade costs on both types of goods decline, in conjunction with low demand elasticities of substitution, generates the two facts laid out in our introduction.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
While we have found a scenario that can qualitatively replicate the puzzle of increasing manufacturing export shares and declining manufacturing output shares, there remains the question of whether this scenario can quantitatively replicate it. We would conjecture that it would be difficult. The primary reason is that recent research by BK and by Yi (2003) show how difficult it is for standard one-sector trade models to explain the growth of world trade without resorting to elasticities of substitution between manufactured goods of about 10-15. In a two sector model, an additional elasticity, the elasticity of substitution between sectors, matters.
To replicate our puzzle above, we need this elasticity to be less than 1. But this would force the elasticity of substitution between manufactured goods to be even higher to explain the growth of trade.
Another possible scenario is one in which developing countries joined the global market in recent decades, and for comparative advantage reasons, this has led to a loss of some manufacturing from OECD countries to developing countries. This globalization scenario differs from ours because it emphasizes the OECD-non-OECD links, while we focus on intra-OECD links. While the forces in this scenario are undoubtedly occurring, we believe they may not be quantitatively important because, as BK shows, the share of intra-OECD trade in total OECD trade rose from abut 46 percent to 61 percent between 1961 and 1990.
We conclude by suggesting an additional propagation mechanism, vertical specialization.
We mean the phenomenon by which countries increasingly specialize in producing only particular stages of a good's production sequence so that a good crosses multiple borders while in process. Recent research has shown that this phenomenon is increasingly empirically important. 
